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"JUST WHAT IS YOUR DEFENSE?"
By JUDGE GEORGE T.

McDERMOTT*

The judicial quality does not reside in form or ceremony, still less in circumlocution and an avoidance of the pitli of the matter. The judicial quality of procedure is
found in the impartial bearing and the reasoned determination upon ascertained facts,
and it may be speedy, summary, and, as our clients would say, businesslike, without
losing its character.---Charles E. Hughes.

UITE by accident, and in blissful ignorance of the
English practice act, I stumbled onto a method of get-

ting at the nub of a case at the beginning of the litigation instead of at the end of it, while in the practice. It
seemed to work, and I tried it out on the bench, and it has
worked well there in the few cases where the play has come
up. That method corresponds closely, I am told, to the
English practice. I see no reason why a rule requiring a few
minutes' face-to-face conference between, the parties, their
counsel, and a trial judge, within a few days after a case is
filed, shouldn't extend the practice to all cases in this country.
I hope the United States Supreme Court will give it serious
consideration when the new rules for law cases are promulgated.
I first came onto the idea in some strike lawsuits brought
to cloud the title to producing oil leases. When oil is struck,
a few lawyers start combing the records to find some technical
flaw in the title-flaws not visible to the naked eye. For
fifteen dollars a suit could be started, and the pipe line companies, not unwilling to hold money in escrow without interest, would not pay for the oil while the title was clouded by
litigation. Plaintiff's counsel never dreamed of winning; he
did know the lessee couldn't drill without getting pay for his
oil; so he figured, too many times correctly, the lessee would
pay a substantial sum to release the pipe line runs.
How could the defense lawyers meet that? After ineffectually fumbling around on such cases, some Kansas lawyers
struck upon the idea of filing an answer the day after the
summons was served, and at the same time they served notice
on plaintiff's counsel of a motion for immediate trial, setting
out the irreparable damage flowing from the delay. That
brought the parties face to face with the trial judge immediately. The trial judges in the oil country recognize a strike
*Of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. *Reprinted
from Journal of the American Judicature Society.
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lawsuit on sight. When plaintiff's counsel appeared on the
motion, within ten days after he brought his suit, he was put
to the rack of the questions, "Just what is your claim?" and
"Why not try it next week?" These queries ended his effort
to use the process of the court for extortion.
Shortly after I went on the district bench, a fine lawyer
wanted an ex parte restraining order to stop the demolition
of some fifty-odd temporary buildings used in constructing a
massive project. Serious damage would flow from either
granting or denying the order, if the first guess was not the
final outcome. A telephone call brought defense counsel in a
few minutes; an around-the-table discussion narrowed the
dispute to ten buildings, and to a simple question of fact; an
agreement was reached that the buildings in dispute would be
torn down last; a trial of the fact question was set for the following week, and the case was over before the wrecking crew
reached the buildings in controversy.
Then we got into the three-judge cases, the bane of a
circuit judge's life. The statute properly demands quick
action; there is never any notice to the distant judge except a
telephone or wire to come now. The statute contemplates a
trial on the preliminary injunction and another on final hearing. Nobody likes to take two bites at a small cherry. So in
our circuit, the judges have been advising counsel to be ready
to try their cases out when the temporary injunction comes
on for hearing, generally about ten days from the filing of the
suit. Some of them kicked against the pricks at the start.
But we'd ask them, "Just what is your claim?" and then
"Just what is your defense. They all knew, and on their feet
they'd tell us. In a very few minutes the nub of the controversy would develop. At times we permitted answers to be
filed, incorporating the defenses stated in court, after the trial.
The Supreme Court has affirmed one such case and did not
suggest that such procedural informality denied anyone due
process.
After a while the lawyers came to expect it, and answers
were ready when the court assembled. We've had a lot of
three-judge cases in five years; only once, I think, has there
been two trials. In nearly all-I think all but one-the case
was finally tried on the application for temporary injunction.
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Among them have been rate cases with volumes of testimony
-a case involving gas rates to 141 towns in Kansas, and the
Denver Stockyard Case-and cases involving far-flung questions of law, as the proration cases from Oklahoma. As far
as we can see, the cases were as thoroughly tried then as if the
trial had been held a year later. At least no one has complained of the lack of a fair hearing.
Some of our district judges have used the same tactics in
single judge cases. On applications for restraining orders,
made when the case was filed, counsel on both sides have been
called in that day or the next. Such a conference has uncovered the real dispute; has discovered whether the bill has too
much or too little in it; has developed the claim and the defense; and very often has set the case for trial.
If that practice works-and it has-in cases where restraining orders are asked, why won't it work in all cases?
You'd be surprised how many dilatory motions to make definite or to strike out can be disposed of by such a conferenceeven before they are filed. A lawyer with a trumped-up case,
unless it is a case founded on perjury, doesn't want to stand
up and tell it to the judge. A defense lawyer with no weapon
but delay has a bad half hour in such a conference. And in
bona fide controversies, it shortens immeasurably the time for
its solution to get at the crux of the case ten days after it is
filed, instead of in the court of appeals two years later.
Of course, if no lawyer brought a hold-up suit; if no
lawyer made a sham defense; if all lawyers wanted to get the
case decided as quickly as possible, such a rule would be unnecessary. But until that day dawns, such a rule tends to
"smoke 'em out."
In the last analysis, the efficiency of our judicial system is
going to depend on men and not on rules. No football coach
ever won a conference title at a rules conference. He wins it
on the field with men. If the bench and bar were all perfect,
any rules would work. But it's a practical world, and the
law business is intensely practical. We must play with the
cards that are dealt us. And as long as we have sham suits
and fake defenses, and as long as some lawyers and judges are
indolent and dilatory, we must have rules that serve to prod
them along.

